The Italian Occupation of Ethiopia: Failure and Consequences

In 1935, Italy took its most ambitious foray into colonialism and empire-building. Ethiopia was one of the last African nations that remained independent, and Italy was a nation that appeared to be on its way to European great power status after a turbulent beginning to independence. Four decades before, Italy had made its first attempt at colonizing Ethiopia and been met with utter humiliation. 1935 would prove different, due to a drastically shifted geopolitical landscape and changed power dynamics. A lot had happened in the past four decades in Italy, and all the results pointed to a stronger and more ambitious state. Benito Mussolini looked to be leading the once second-rate nation into a new resurgent era where Italy would be respected and feared. The results of the 1935 invasion and subsequent occupation of Ethiopia seemed to reinforce this, both inside and outside Italy. However, Italian celebrations of a new empire would prove to be premature, and Italy would reap more harm than benefits in colonizing Ethiopia. It became one of the most disastrous endeavors in colonization of all time, for both the Italians and Ethiopians. The international community was toothless, selfish, and ineffective in preventing this debacle, despite having more than the necessary power to do so. The Italian occupation of Ethiopia was shameful, unsuccessful, and drained Italian resources in the short term before postwar Italy was allowed by the international community to hide from its crimes. The effects on Ethiopia were nothing short of devastating, in both the short and long term.

The Battle of Adwa was a fresh wound for Italy, even almost four decades later. The fledgling nation had tried to take part in the Scramble for Africa and been denied what it would consider its crown jewel, the mountainous, fertile, diverse nation of Ethiopia. It had been denied through its own military incompetence and European intervention on the side of the Ethiopians, two obstacles it had begun seeking to overcome through its newfound strength. 1896 remained the defining moment for the Italian state in the eyes of outsiders, a humiliation that in order for Italy overcome it could only reverse. At the height of Social Darwinism, the Italians had been defeated by a people seen as inferior, raising doubts about the Italians own “Europeanness” and its place among the European community. Not only that, Italy’s recovery from the disaster had seemed to prove its Northern European doubters right. It had remained poor, divided, weak, and on the periphery. When Benito Mussolini came to power, he consolidated the state under fascism and sought to reverse all the stereotypes that had plagued Italy. The true results of this were mixed, but the perception of Italy had changed. Italy appeared to be modernizing under Mussolini and put out an image of ambition, military strength, and newfound stability. Still, the legacy of Adwa plagued this image of a new nation. Statues, public displays, and rhetoric espousing the superior qualities of the “Italian race” rang hollow when defeat at the hands of a supposedly inferior race hadn’t been avenged. In terms of foreign policy, Italy felt it could not be on equal footing as colonial European powers with a small colonial presence. A new Roman Empire seemed far off when Italy had not established even a relatively mid-sized colonial empire. Mussolini knew Adwa remained a black mark on Italy’s reputation and status, no matter what changes they had made domestically. Accordingly, he had made preparations for an invasion of Ethiopia in 1925, and considered it a matter of very high importance for the prestige of his regime (Sbacchi “Italian Mandate or Protectorate”, 560).

Italy’s motives for invading Ethiopia were not only psychological. Along with this mental aspect came practicality: “These are the usual motives for expansion, and Italy on this occasion felt that these justified her aggression. The population of Italy was dense and the expedient method of alleviating this problem seemed to lie in colonialism. By this measure the talents of the immigrants would not be lost to the mother country” (Hunt, 10). Italy had suffered economically, especially in the South, largely because of overpopulation. Mass emigration had alleviated this, but Mussolini had banned it in 1927 (“Early population policy in fascist Italy”). Italy would press hard in a campaign attempting to convince many on the population to move to Ethiopia, seen as a far more ideal settler colony. The typical colonial extraction of resources to help the Italian economy was obviously a motive as well. Two decades before, Italy had wanted to expand far deeper into Africa than their small East African territories in Somalia and Eritrea. During World War I, France and Great Britain had led Italy to believe they would be included in taking over Germany’s colonies in Africa and some territory in the Ottoman Empire (Hunt, 11). The breaking of this promise, as well as the rejection of most other Italian territorial demands, had created a desire for expansion that presented much political gain for the man who seized on it.

In order to secure an uninhibited conquest of Ethiopia, there were many political and diplomatic machinations Italy had to undertake before 1935. The fact Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations, ironically largely due to Italian support (Hunt, 12), would make things far more difficult. However, Italy found itself intentionally or possibly unintentionally in a position of great luck regarding this. Confidence in the League of Nations was at an all-time low, and many major players in world politics were not a part of it or had withdrawn recently. The League had shown no ability or will to check ambitious states in other instances, like during Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. France and Great Britain were the only influential enough states to propel the League to action and had interests in Ethiopia. It would essentially require only their consent in order to launch the planned invasion. Meanwhile, there had been a border skirmish between Italian and Ethiopian troops which had become known as the Wal Wal incident. This had greatly heightened tensions between Italy and Ethiopia and become an excuse for an Italian military buildup. The League showed no interest in handling this dispute and ruled that both parties were blameless over increasingly desperate Ethiopian pleas. In the face of the crisis, important players in the League of Nations reaffirmed their commitment to its mission of collective security but these were empty words without a military commitment. Two weeks before the invasion, the League of Nations promised to ensure the independence and integrity of Ethiopia, but there was no reference to how this would be done (Sbacchi, “Italian Mandate or Protectorate”, 571). One writer commented: “[Ethiopian Emperor] Haile Selassie was left like the birds in the air, with no one but God to look after him” (Hunt, 30).

All that was left to gain were special assurances from France and Great Britain, and Mussolini worked tirelessly to achieve this along with his diplomats. Neither power was against Italian domination or increased Italian presence in Ethiopia, but they were hesitant towards full-scale colonization. As late as June 1936, three months before the Italian invasion, Mussolini was told by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden that “Great Britain would give in to Italian wishes as long as Ethiopian independence remained” (Sbacchi, “Italian Mandate or Protectorate”, 564). France folded far more easily, rightfully worried about German aggression in the coming years: “France had a southern frontier and, in the event of a war with Germany, Italy would be a necessary ally to France in any dispute with her historic enemy” (Hunt, 30). The British had a greater commercial and economic presence in Ethiopia, but they were averse to standing alone or starting conflict in the age of appeasement. They remained a thorn in the side of the Italians before and during their invasion, advocating for League sanctions to be put on them. Britain first worked on peace proposals with Italy in collaboration with France, known as the Hoare-Laval agreements (Samuel Hoare was the British foreign secretary, Pierre Laval the French Prime Minister). These would divide Ethiopia and give huge swathes of its territory to the Italians, but still maintain an independent Ethiopian state. Mussolini was on the verge of accepting these before an enraged British public forced Hoare to resign, causing the whole agreement to crumble (Sbacchi, “Italian Mandate or Protectorate, 575). Britain therefore stood aside, except for allowing Emperor Haile Selassie to flee to their territory after Italian forces marched into Addis Ababa. Italy had successfully bullied and cowed the great powers into accepting their ambition, a stunning reversal of how they had been perceived in years before.

Italy began its invasion of Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. It would be a nine-month operation that in most accounts, went far less than smoothly for Italy. The invasion was expected to be complete in two months, and Italy naively expected some of the Ethiopian population to rise against the emperor and fight with them. Despite many claims in propaganda, this was not true and very few Ethiopians were open to being “civilized”, especially at the time of the invasion. The League of Nations, in a last-ditch measure, imposed damaging economic sanctions on Italy. These were felt by the Italian economy but were not enough to force Italy into capitulation and the invasion continued (Hunt, 89). The Italians faced a full mobilization of the Ethiopian state and far heavier casualties than expected. In the face of such stiff resistance, the Italians committed numerous war crimes. General Pietro Badoglio, the leader of the invasion, dropped 280-kilogram bombs filled with mustard gas on Ethiopian cities and villages. Several hundred tons of the banned gas were used before the invasion was over. Italian planes even strafed Red Cross camps in a shocking, unnecessary display of cruelty (Carroll). Even more horrifying is the knowledge that worse was to come. By the time Italian forces marched into the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, more than 10,000 Italians had been killed in the invasion. Emperor Haile Selassie had fled two days earlier to make another appeal to the League of Nations and had instructed his commanders to stand down in order to stop the atrocities. If Italian casualties were bad, Ethiopian civilian and military casualties were appalling. Numbers are difficult to pinpoint, but by the end of the invasion in May 1936 several hundred thousand Ethiopians are estimated to have been killed (Barker). The final capture of Addis Ababa resulted in massive celebrations across Italy and is marked as the Mussolini regime’s height of popularity. Finally, Italy had earned respect militarily and become the colonial power it had dreamed of being. However, keeping Ethiopia would prove even harder than taking it and prove the whole endeavor a devastating mistake.

When Emperor Haile Selassie fled Ethiopia in the face of the Italian armies, it would be far from his last act of defiance towards the Italian occupation. Once he reached Jerusalem in the British mandate of Palestine, he called an end to his military’s resistance to the invasion. In the same breath, he called the invasion the “most sweeping, the most unjust, and the most inhuman war of modern times” (Hunt, 100). One month later, he would make his way to the League of Nations assembly in Geneva and deliver one of the most iconic speeches of the 20th century. In hindsight, Selassie’s words were a near-perfect description of the conflict made in the form of a grievance. He described in detail the various war crimes committed by the Italian military, his words verified by news reports and later studies. In each section of the address, Selassie touched on the various violations of previous treaties and international law by the Italians. Knowing he had nothing else left to lose, he held back no criticisms and reserved his vitriol for the European great powers he had trusted: “What have become of the promises made to me as long ago as October, 1935? I noted with grief, but without surprise that three Powers considered their undertakings under the Covenant as absolutely of no value. Their connections with Italy impelled them to refuse to take any measures whatsoever in order to stop Italian aggression” (Selassie). His justified anger at the League foreshadowed the inaction and cowardice which allowed for the beginning of World War II: “Your Assembly will doubtless have laid before it proposals for the reform of the Covenant and for rendering more effective the guarantee of collective security. Is it the Covenant that needs reform? What undertakings can have any value if the will to keep them is lacking? It is international morality which is at stake and not the Articles of the Covenant” (Selassie). The answer he received from the League of Nations was, typically, silence. However, his speech received considerable international attention and praise. With the advent of newsreels, Selassie was able to reach an audience far from Geneva. The speech resonated heavily with the public in many nations already angry with the League’s lack of action. Many newspapers ramped up in their condemnation of their governments and the League: “Was it really impossible to foresee, and foreseeing, to prevent, Mussolini’s bloody adventure? Is the collective peace system really so clumsy that it can do nothing to preserve peace?” one British paper wrote (Pankhurst). Selassie’s assertions on collective security would prove veracious in hindsight.

Italy had finished its conquest and had its celebration, but Italianizing and making Ethiopia a productive part of their new empire would be a far more daunting task. The first thing done was incorporating Ethiopia into the Italian East Africa colony, which included neighboring Eritrea and Somalia. King Victor Emmanuel III was named Emperor of Ethiopia, and Pietro Badoglio, the general who led the invasion, was given true governing power as First Viceroy. He would soon be succeeded by general Rodolfo Graziani, nicknamed the “Butcher of Libya”. Local fascist governing branches known as fascios were set up in every relevant city or town, and most local leaders rushed to Addis Ababa in order to pledge allegiance to the new colonial government (Steiner, 887). The whole East Africa colony was separated into five zones of governance with separate administrations which answered to the central government in Addis Ababa. Token forms of representation for the native population were established, such as including six native representatives in the central fascist Consulta (Steiner, 898). In a bright spot for the Italian colonial regime, they did take into account different traditional forms of justice among the Christian and Muslim populations and allowed them to establish separate courts. Still, the native population, as typical in most colonies, was afforded very little actual say in decisions made. The governance of the entirety of Italian East Africa was heavily centralized in Addis Ababa, and power mostly resided in the hands of Graziani.

Italy had much difficulty in making the conquest of Ethiopia a worthwhile expectation, starting from the moment they conquered it. There were two main goals which the Rome and Addis Ababa government had deemed most important: settling Italian colonists and making Ethiopia profitable for the mother country. Leading government officials in both cities had espoused rhetoric of “civilization”, but this was a front and practically unimportant, as evidenced by later actions. Italians were particularly interested in the agricultural sphere, which could become a refuge for poor Italian farmers and could provide food and material resources for the Italian peninsula. The aim was to induce Italian immigration to Ethiopia, with the reward of an increase in social status and some monetary incentive: “Italians in Ethiopia would not be day laborers, an occupation reserved only for the Ethiopians, but would be farmowners and, as such, direct the work of Ethiopian toilers” (Sbacchi, “Italian Colonization”, 505). Other goals included taking over the export of Ethiopian goods in exchange for foreign currency and the development of Ethiopia in general as a matter of prestige and practical comfort for Italian colonists. There was a stunning lack of planning to make this possible, and a lack of knowledge of the land and terrain. Early studies done by Italian experts showed that Ethiopia would be most productive if focus was put on agriculture, but doubted the ability of the administration to sufficiently gain a hold over most regions. For example, the “colonization possibilities in Amhara and Galla Sidama were considered extremely good, but because of poor communications they would have to be developed at a later time” (Sbacchi, “Italian Colonization”, 509). Poor communications would hound the Italian administration through the entirety of their occupation, hindering the ability to settle Italian colonists and interaction between province administrations, leading to long bureaucratic delays, and allowing the Ethiopian resistance to operate.

Not only this, but the regions in which land was considered suitable for this agricultural colonization were also already heavily inhabited by Ethiopians. Increasingly, the Italians had to be careful in these regions to keep Ethiopians away from resistance movements. It was a catch-22 in the sense that Italy used too much of its profits to fight resistance, but if Italy operated Ethiopia in the most profitable manner they risked pushing natives toward resistance movements. Another hindrance to Italian colonization was the lack of public works to provide for Italians who would immigrate to Ethiopia, and the Addis Ababa administration did not want extensive amounts of immigrants to enter if they could not be truly settled. This is expertly summarized by Sbacchi: “Public works required huge sums. Italy had limited capital and, by assuming too many contracts, money would be taken away from activities like agriculture. Besides, a too drastic transformation of the country would require Ethiopian manpower. Ethiopians attracted by high-paying jobs would leave their field and thus lessen agricultural production.” (Sbacchi, “Italian Colonization”, 512). Fruitful colonization of Ethiopia would require a long time, and the Italians did it slowly to minimize cost. Experts and administrators “saw the need to contain Italian colonization within modest limits because it had absorbed large state capital and was not producing enough to pay for its huge expenses” (Sbacchi, “Italian Colonization”, 513). The Italians never considered that they would never break even, and Ethiopia would prove to be a black hole for Italian resources which hurt their economy and eventually their effort in the Second World War.

Before discussing the Ethiopian resistance and its debilitating effect on Italian colonization efforts, the most important event of the occupation period must be discussed. In February 1937, there was an assassination attempt on Viceroy Rodolfo Graziani in Addis Ababa by two Eritreans. Graziani was injured and fell into a coma, but not killed. In response, the Italian administration ordered an indiscriminate, brutal slaughter in Addis Ababa. The accounts of this massacre, kept under the radar by Italy then and today, are horrifying. Fascist Blackshirts “stabbed, bludgeoned and incinerated [victims]. Flamethrowers were used to set fire to cottages dotted around Addis Ababa in which thousands of innocents — defenseless children, women and the elderly- were immolated” (Mankinde). The administration also used this opportunity to target the educated and influential in the community, known as the “Young Ethiopians”. These people were largely educated in western institutions and were the natives’ best representation. Mankinde summarises that “the Italian authorities then targeted Ethiopia’s ‘nobles and notables’. Traveling ‘Caravans of Death’, consisting of portable gallows, were used to hang influential members of the community including those of the aristocratic class” (Mankinde). Many assert that this massacre of Ethiopia’s educated and elite had been planned far in advance and simply needed a pretext. This massacre, known in Ethiopia as Yekatit 12, claimed the lives of up to 30,000 people out of Addis Ababa’s population of 100,000. Even an order by Mussolini to stop the slaughter was not effective, and reprisals were carried out over a course of three days. The result of this was a large-scale alienation of the Ethiopian population which spurred many to violent resistance and hindered Italian development efforts. Just as in the invasion, Italian war crimes had hurt their own colonialization efforts. More importantly, Ethiopia’s intellectual class was decimated, with devastating consequences for the future of their nation.

Crimes against humanity in Italian East Africa were not limited to the invasion nor the massacres which took place in years after. The Italians also established concentration camps across Ethiopia, which they had already been operating in other colonies. According to a United States Holocaust Memorial Museum study on concentration camps, “the Italians established in that colony internment camps, concentration camps, prisoner of war (POW) camps, forced labor camps, transit camps, and prisons to fulfill colonial, wartime, and genocidal aims” (“Italian-Occupied East Africa”). Any racial miscegenation between Italians and Ethiopians was banned, resulting in both violators being sent to these camps in some cases. However, in most cases, only the Ethiopian involved in the relationship would be sent to the camps while the Italian received up to five years in prison. In these camps, disease, overcrowding, and starvation were rampant (“Italian-Occupied East Africa”). Research on Italian concentration camps is sparse and limited, but it is estimated that up to 35,000 East Africans died within their confines (Barker).

Nonviolent and violent resistance to fascist domination in Ethiopia was being organized even before Marshal Badoglio and the victorious Italian troops marched into Addis Ababa in May 1936. The resistance did not aim to directly overthrow fascist rule, but “to increase the military and social costs of occupation until they became untenable leading to the eventual overthrow of Fascist rule” (Schaefer, 87). This was done both by Ethiopian resistance fighters, known to Ethiopians as Arbegnoch, and ordinary citizens by economic means. As discussed earlier, even without resistance it would have taken a long time for Italy to have made Ethiopia a productive and profitable colony. The costs of the initial invasion and development efforts had already run far higher than estimated and Italy was already poor in comparison to other colonial powers. Ethiopia geographically is an incredibly hard nation to maintain control over, with a large variance in terrain and near-impassable highlands. This made large portions of the country virtually inaccessible to the Italians and secure places for the Arbegnoch to gather and retreat to in their guerilla resistance. Graziani had realized this in 1936, and requested 172,000 more troops to maintain control, again increasing Italy’s financial obligation in Ethiopia (Schaefer, 89).

Italy was also suffering financially from their attempts to impose the Italian lire on the Ethiopian population. One example of resistance to Italian colonization efforts was in the practice of currency exchange and smuggling. Even before the war, the Ethiopian peasantry was deeply suspicious of banks and prone to hoarding wealth from state authorities. The only currencies widely respected among lower-class Ethiopians were barter and the Maria Theresa thaler. The Italians found that workers in their industries such as mining would only accept thalers, and if paid in lire they would desert en masse and bring the industry to a standstill. Italian authorities tried to force Ethiopians to exchange their thalers for lire, but for every thaler taken off the market many more were smuggled in. The black market for thalers became lucrative, and they could be exchanged illegally for far larger sums of lire than they were actually worth. The lire would then be smuggled out to Djibouti and exchanged for thalers in foreign banks and these would be smuggled back in. The Italian authorities would have to exchange lire for these thalers at their own exchange rate, essentially buying back their own currency at a loss. The thaler was also valued far higher by Ethiopians than it was in foreign banks, leading to a huge profit margin for the smugglers which they could use for favors. Therefore, those sent to crack down on this currency smuggling could be easily bribed, and “at its apex somewhere between 200,000 to 2,000,000 lire were smuggled out of Ethiopia per week, all to be repurchased by the Italian government through its banks” (Schaefer, 102). This was just one form of nonviolent resistance that cost the Italians dearly. The violent resistance by the Arbegnoch also cost Italy in the maintenance of troops and minimized the areas they could even enter, much less Italianize. This resistance turned Ethiopia from an already unprofitable colony to a disaster, which hurt Italy’s capital to supply their eventual war effort in World War II.

The Arbegnoch would help British troops liberate Ethiopia at the outbreak of World War II. This would take less than half the time it took Italy to conquer Ethiopia, and Halie Selassie would return to Ethiopia victorious in May 1941 (“East African Campaign”).

As discussed, the occupation of Ethiopia was an unmitigated, costly failure for Italy. But what of Ethiopia? Since 1941, Ethiopia has been marred by political instability and civil war. It is one of the poorest nations on Earth and currently has become susceptible to Chinese domination of their economy which could soon turn into deep political influence. It is difficult to pinpoint how much of Ethiopia’s turbulent recent past comes down to its suffering during the Italian occupation. In the short-term, the Italians destroyed villages, committed war crimes, and killed an estimated 760,000 people from the prewar population of 12 million (Barker). With the reparations paid by Italy to Ethiopia, they could begin to rebuild their country. However, Ethiopian leaders could not rebuild the state’s authority, nor replace the people the Italians had killed. The destruction of Ethiopia’s elite removed almost every relevant pre-occupation community leader. It limited the number of competent individuals in post-war government, business, and scholarship. Most of the educated “Young Ethiopians” Haile Selassie intended to run the country in later years had been killed, and Ethiopia did not have the resources to educate and train others to replace them. Italy intended to leave Ethiopia rudderless and submissive by killing its leaders, and it succeeded in doing so despite reaping none of the benefits. Ethiopia has submitted to ethnic tensions, corruption, instability, and violence. The Ethiopian monarchy’s state infrastructure was irreversibly damaged by the occupation, and over the years it ceased to be the force that held together the diverse and underdeveloped nation it ruled. Emperor Haile Selassie, despite his courageous resistance and leadership through the occupation, was deposed in 1974 in a military coup and murdered the year after.

The only justice Ethiopia ever received was in the form of reparations. Pietro Badoglio and Rodolfo Graziani died of natural causes in Italy despite their numerous crimes. The United States and United Kingdom were worried about driving Italy towards the Soviet Union by being harsh in the prosecution of Italian war criminals. Italy was able to cover up its crimes, though the international community never looked too deeply into them. The Italian state was able to perpetuate the myth that it was a victim of fascism both to its own citizens and to the international community.

The occupation of Ethiopia only proved useful to Italy in the form of propaganda and proved harmful in nearly every other aspect. For Ethiopians, the occupation was a traumatic and devastating period of history which laid the roots for instability and violence for years to come. The Italians showed brutality, incompetence, and a complete lack of understanding of Ethiopia and its people. Their occupation gave Ethiopia all the death, destruction, and oppression which came with colonialism and not one notable benefit. The international community, in the form of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, failed Ethiopia on multiple occasions and did not hold up collective security nor administer justice. The Italian occupation of Ethiopia can be considered nothing but a failure for all involved. Only one nation is forced to live with the consequences today.

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